

The Managed Heart  
Commercialization of  
Human Feeling

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show that emotion is more central to life as they live it than to life as they study it.

Many social psychologists give emotion short shrift by subsuming it under some conceptual umbrella. For example, in an otherwise informative study of soldiers' attitudes toward the Women's Army Corps in 1950, Suchman and colleagues subsume emotion under the concept of affect: "Affect toward an object can be very generally classified as either positive or negative. For our purposes, however, annoyance, anger, distrust, and fright are all shadings of negative affect, and these shadings we shall ignore" (cited in Newcomb et al. 1965, p. 48). When emotion is subsumed in this way, the interesting dimension of emotion becomes the "how much." What precisely there is "a lot" of or "a little" of is unclear. We lose the distinction between a fearful dislike of the Women's Army Corps and an angry dislike of it. We lose a wealth of clues about the various definitions of reality that people apply when adopting an attitude. We lose the idea that emotions reflect the individual's sense of the self-relevance of a perceived situation. We lose an appreciation of what the language of emotion can tell us.\*

For those who do not deny or subsume emotion, two other ideas sometimes obstruct our clear understanding of emotion. These are: (1) The idea that an emotion, like anger or jealousy, can have an independent presence or identity within a person through time. (2) The idea that when possessed by emotion we are led to act irrationally and see distortedly. Because these notions are sometimes applied by writers in both the organismic and the interactional camps, we should exam-

\* There is loss when emotion is conceptually ripped away from the situation to which it is attached. When Aristotle discusses his fifteen emotions, Descartes his six, Hobbes his seven, Spinoza his three (with forty-eight derivatives), McDougall his seven, and Tonkkins his eight, the immediate relation of emotion to viewpoint or frame is lost. This is also a problem with Joel Davatz's otherwise interesting attempt to formulate a dictionary of emotions (1969), just as modern linguists now examine language as it is used in social context, so emotion, another sort of language, is best understood in relation to its social context.

ine their content before turning to the assumptions that divide the organismic and interactional theorists.

Does emotion have a presence or identity independent of the person it is "in"? We talk as if it did. We commonly speak of "expressing," "storing," "getting in touch with," or even "spreading" an emotion. We speak of guilt as something that "haunts" us, or fear as something that "grips," "strikes," "betrays," "paralyzes," or "overwhelms" us. Fear, as we talk about it, is something that can lurk, hide, creep, look up, or attack. Love is something we fall into or out of. Anger is something that overtakes or overwhelms us. In this way of talking we use the fiction of some independent, outside agency in order to describe a contrasting inner state.

As Roy Schafer points out in *A New Language for Psychoanalysis* (1976), the very way we normally talk about an emotion, our very use of nouns such as "anxiety" or "love" or "anger" suggests entity. Even verbals such as "fearing" or "dreading" (we can't speak of "anxiousing") are themselves abstractions and carry the same implications as the nouns they replace. Schafer proposes a new action language as a substitute for common parlance. He would remove expressions like "to fear" or "fearing" because they refer abstractly to a number of separate actions and modes of action; thus "to fear may subsume to flee, to avoid, to act timidly, or placatingly" (p. 275). Though Schafer is perceptive in identifying common expressions that embody problematic assumptions, his action language seems to me too simple an apparatus for coping with the complexity of everyday emotional life.

Commonly we find ourselves speaking of emotion as if it had a location or residence. When we speak of love as residing in the heart and envy in the bile, the heart and the bile are put in place of the person. The speaker personifies an organ or portrays emotion as "a substance or quantity of energy of a certain kind." We also speak of emotions as having some sort

of continuous identity, as when we say an emotion is "stored" or "accumulated," or when we refer to an "old" emotion.

Metaphors that suggest agency, residence, and continuity through time often convey with uncanny precision just what it *feels like* to experience an emotion; they enjoy a poetic accuracy. But they can get in the way of understanding how emotion works.

A second idea that impedes our understanding of emotion is that the inner state of emotion is always associated with outer action that is irrational. This is sometimes the case and sometimes not. A man who feels fear at the sight of a rattlesnake moving toward him may run to safety. He may act rationally. Were he not afraid, he might not run, which in the absence of other forms of protection, would be irrational. Again, a mother may, with the feeling of love, reach out to hug her child. Here, too, the feeling and act seem consonant and "rational" in the sense that what a person does, under the influence of feeling, gets people where they want to go as much if not more than what a person would do if not under the influence of feeling. They only reason I pose these obvious examples is that when people talk about "acting emotionally," it is often not these examples they cite. That is, we tend to associate the idea of emotion more with irrational or unwise actions than with rational or wise actions. This tendency results more from our cultural policy toward emotional life ("watch out for it, manage it") than it results from observing the relation between feeling and action in all the common but inconspicuous instances in which they are related.

## TWO MODELS OF EMOTION

Two basic models of emotion have emerged in the last century. From the work of Charles Darwin, William James, and the early Sigmund Freud, an organismic model appears.\*

\* McDougall (1937, 1948) and Tomkins (1962) have also contributed to the organismic model of emotion. Although Tomkins's theory covers a broad range of

From the works of John Dewey, Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, and Erving Goffman, versions of an interactional model appear. The two models differ in several fundamental respects.

First, the organismic model defines emotion as mainly a biological process. For the early Freud, emotion (affect) is libidinal discharge, for Darwin it is instinct, and for James it is the perception of a psychological process. By virtue of the stress on instinct and energy, the organismic theorists postulate a basic fixity of emotion and a basic similarity of emotion across categories of people. For the interactionists, on the other hand, it is enough to say that emotion *always* involves *some* biological component. Whether the biological processes involved in fear, for example, actually differ from those involved in anger (James thought they do; Cannon proved they do not) is a matter of little theoretical interest to the interactionist, whose main concern is the *meaning* that psychological processes take on.

Second, in the organismic model, the manner in which we label, assess, manage, or express an emotion is seen as *extrinsic* to emotion and is therefore of less interest than how the emotion is "motored by instinct."

Third, in the organismic model, emotion is assumed to have a prior existence apart from introspection, and introspection is thought to be passive, lacking in evocative power. As one psychoanalytic theorist reasoned:

Introspection provides abundant examples, one of which the reader, if he is so inclined, may notice in himself at this very moment. We know that a "feeling tone," an affective quality, is always present as a part of our stream of experience, conscious or unconscious. Yet if this paper has captured your interest, it is probable that you have not been aware of your feelings during the past few minutes in which you have been reading it. If you

phenomena, it focuses on the relationship between drive and emotion. He distinguishes eight innate affects, which are said to be evoked by "innate activators" that serve as "drive signals."

now set it aside for a moment and introspect, you will notice your own immediate feeling. You may be comfortable, slightly irritated, mildly depressed, etc., but some feeling will be there. *The affect, until you noticed it, had been present but not in awareness: it was preconscious.* (Pulver 1971, p. 351; my emphasis)

For the interactionist, it is highly questionable that the feeling had been present all along. How do we know, they ask, that the very focusing of attention and use of cognitive power does not in itself evoke the feeling? And if the act of attending to feeling helps shape the feeling itself, that feeling cannot be referred to independently of these acts. Similarly, for the interactionist, the act of management is inseparable from the experience that is managed; it is in part the *creation* of that emerging experience. Just as knowing affects what is known, so managing affects what is "there" to be managed. This reflexivity of expression is generally doubled by organismic theorists (see Lofgren 1968). In the organic, "discharge" theory of affects, the manifestation of an emotion is almost epiphenomenal because emotion is presumed to be linked to impervious organic givens.\* In sum, for the interactional theorists, emotion is open-ended whereas for the organismic theorists it is fixed.

Fourth, the organismic stress on instinctual fixity reflects an interest in the origins of emotion, a subject of little concern to interactionalists. Darwin, for example, traces emotion back to its phylogenetic origin and points to evidence of similarities between emotions in animals and in human beings. Freud traces emotion experienced in the present back to ideas whose origin often lies in childhood (Brenner 1974, p. 542). The interactional model, on the other hand, points attention away from origins and focuses instead on aspects of emotion that uniquely differentiate social groups of normal adult humans.

\* In the early Freudian model, a lack of reflexivity implies that ego cannot much alter the character of emotion. Sometimes this is explicit: Alexander and Isaacs note, "It seems unlikely that the ego changes the quality of the affect" (1964, p. 232). Often buttressing this view is the notion that the ego is weak, as it is for the child. For the interactionist, the prototypic ego is that of the normal adult, and it has a moderate amount of strength.

Each difference between the two models implies different links between social factors and emotion. In the organismic model, social factors merely "trigger" biological reactions and help steer the expression of these reactions into customary channels. In the interactional model, social factors enter into the *very formulation* of emotions, through codification, management, and expression.

### THE ORGANISMIC MODEL

Charles Darwin, Darwin's *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (1872) has offered a model of emotion for various other theorists and researchers. Darwin focuses on *emotive expressions*—that is, on *visible gestures*—and not on the subjective meanings associated with them. These gestures, he posits, were acquired during a prehistoric period and have survived as "serviceable associated habits." Originally linked to actions, these emotive gestures become actions *manqué*. The emotion of love, for example, is the vestige of what was once a direct act of copulation. The baring of teeth in rage is a vestige of the once immediate act of biting. The expression of disgust is the vestige of what was once the immediate act of regurgitating a noxious thing. For Darwin, there is no emotion without gesture although there may be gesture without action.

Darwin's theory of emotion, then, is a theory of gesture. The question for later students thus became: are emotive gestures universal or are they culturally specific? Darwin's own general conclusion was that they were universal.\* The

\* Darwin distinguished between facial expressions of emotion that are innate and universal and facial gestures (not necessarily of emotion) that are learned and thus culturally variable. He devised a sixteen-item questionnaire and sent it to thirty-six missionaries and others who had lived in non-Western societies. One question was: "Can a dogged or obstinate expression be recognized, which is chiefly shown by the mouth being firmly closed, a lowering brow, and a slight frown?" Based on his returned questionnaires, Darwin concluded that "the chief expressive actions" of human beings were innate and therefore universal. Despite his generally universalist interpretations, however, Darwin concluded that some nonverbal behaviors (such as weeping, kissing, nodding, and shaking the head in affirmation and negation) were not universal but culture-specific and "learned like the words of a language" (quoted by Dane Archer in Rosenthal et al. (1979, p. 352).

debate has been carried forward by those who argue that emotional expressions are probably innate (Ekman 1971, 1983; Ekman et al. 1972) and those who argue that they are modeled on language and therefore culturally variable (Klineberg 1938; Birdwhistell 1970; La Barre 1964; Hall 1973; Rosenthal 1979, p. 201). What is missing from both sides of this debate is what was missing in Darwin's theory from the beginning: a conception of emotion as subjective experience and a more subtle and complex notion of how social factors impinge.

Taking another tack, but subject to the same critique, Randall Collins unites a Darwinian concept of emotion with a Durkheimian notion of ritual as a means of arousing emotion (1975, p. 95).<sup>\*</sup> He then argues (drawing on his conflict model) that men compete with each other for control of the ritual apparatus, which is a powerful tool for commanding people by controlling their emotions (pp. 59, 102). Yet in this interesting development of Darwin, the same push-button model of emotion remains unquestioned.

*Sigmund Freud.* Freud's thinking on emotion, or affect, went through three major developments. In his early writings he thought affect to be dammed-up libido indicating itself as tension and anxiety; affect was the manifestation of instinct.<sup>†</sup> At the turn of the century, he came to think of affect as a concomitant of drive. Then in 1923, in *The Ego and the Id*, he came to stress the role of the ego as a mediator between the id (drive) and conscious expression. Affects were now seen as signals of impending danger (from inside or outside) and as an impetus to action. The ego was as-

\* Collins gets Darwin right but Durkheim wrong. Having imputed a stress on animal instincts to Durkheim (in *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1965)), he presents himself as drawing from Durkheim this heritage from Darwin. He wants to link Durkheim to Darwin via an interest in the similarity of animals and human beings (Collins 1975, p. 95). In fact, whereas Darwin stresses the similarity between humans and other animals, Durkheim stresses their differences. Animals cannot symbolize, and so Durkheim was not very interested in them.

† Thomas Schiefel, in his essay "The Distancing of Emotion in Ritual," draws on Freud's early notion of catharsis and with it the idea of emotion as the "discharge" of one or more distressful emotions (grief, fear, embarrassment, anger). "These emotions," he notes, are "physical states of tension in the body produced by stress" (Schiefel 1977, p. 185). See also Hochschild (1977) and Glover (1939).

signed the capacity to postpone id drives, to neutralize or bind them (see Brenner 1974, p. 537).

Unlike Darwin, Freud singled out one emotion—anxiety—as the model for all others, reasoning that it was more important because the unpleasantness of anxiety led to the development of various ego defenses against that unpleasantness. As Brenner notes, "As analysts we recognize that anxiety occupies a special position in mental life. It is the motive for defense. Defenses serve the purpose of minimizing, or, if possible, preventing the development of anxiety" (1974, p. 542). Anxiety was initially defined in a way that bypasses the ego: anxiety was "the reaction to an influx of stimuli which is too great for the mental apparatus to master or discharge" (p. 533). Rejecting this model, Brenner suggests:

Anxiety is an emotion . . . which the anticipation of danger evokes in the ego. It is not present as such from birth or very early infancy. In such very early periods the infant is aware only of pleasure or displeasure. . . . As experience increases, and other ego functions develop (e.g., memory and sensory perception), the child becomes able to predict or anticipate that a state of displeasure (a "traumatic situation") will develop. This dawning ability of the child to react to danger in advance is the beginning of the specific emotion of anxiety, which in the course of further development we may suppose to become increasingly sharply differentiated from other unpleasant emotions. (Brenner 1953, p. 22)

Freud's focus on anxiety was part of his concern with masochistic, incapacitating, "pathological" emotions that exaggerate the normal case. Furthermore, important as it is to understand it, anxiety is not typical of all other emotions in several ways. We do not try to avoid joy or love in the way that we typically try to avoid anxiety. Anxiety is also atypical in that it is an emotion without a defined object; one is not anxious *at* someone in the same way that one is furious *at* or in love *with* someone.

For Freud, unlike Darwin, the meaning of a feeling (the ideational representations associated with affect) is crucial

but often unconscious. As Freud explained, "To begin with it may happen that an affect or an emotion is perceived but misconstrued. By the repression of its proper presentation it is forced to become connected with another idea, and is now interpreted by consciousness as the expression of this other idea. If we restore the true connection, we call the original affect 'unconscious' although the affect was never unconscious but its ideational presentation had undergone repression" (Freud, 1915b, p. 110).<sup>\*</sup> Thus the focus in Freud's early writing on instinctual givens, on anxiety as the main connection the individual has with them, and on the unconscious as a mediator between individual understanding and instinct led him to conceive of social influences mediated through the ego and superego as relatively unimportant. Like Darwin, he had little to say about how cultural rules might (through the superego) apply to the ego's operations (emotion work) on id (feeling).

*William James.* If for Darwin emotion is instinctual gesture and if for the early Freud emotion (affect) is the manifestation of dammed-up libido, for James emotion is the brain's conscious reaction to instinctual visceral changes. As James noted in his *Principles of Psychology* (1890): "My theory . . . is that bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion" (cited in Hillman 1964, p. 50).

This theory has been at the heart of much controversy between the centralists (such as Cannon and Schachter) and the peripheralists (such as James and Lange).<sup>†</sup> James

\* There is a lively debate on the question of whether, apart from ideas, feelings can be unconscious (see Pulver 1971). Moutte and Welsh, as aspects of affect, are certainly assumed to be potentially unconscious. Fenchel (1954) and Greenston (1953), for example, hypothesize that boredom involves an unconscious attempt to convince oneself that one does not want to gratify an instinctual wish that is frightening, and therefore one has no wish to do anything.

† As Hillman points out, there was a difference between James and Lange. For James, emotion is conscious feeling and bodily change together at the same time. For Lange emotion is bodily change, the feeling of which is secondary in consequence (Hillman 1964, p. 50). For a careful exegesis of James, see Hillman (1964), pp. 49–60.

equates emotion with bodily change and visceral feeling. From this it follows that different emotions will be accompanied by different, not similar, bodily states. Manipulation of bodily states, by drugs or surgery, will also manipulate emotional states. Cannon's 1927 experimental work (1929) refuted the James-Lange theory. He found that the total separation of the viscera from the central nervous system (which gives us our sensations) does not alter emotional behavior. The dog operated on could still, it was presumed, feel emotion. Further, the viscera are relatively insensitive and change slowly, unlike emotions (see Schachter and Singer 1962, 1974; Kemper 1978; and Chapters Seven and Eight). After Cannon's work, psychologists sought to discriminate between emotional states according to cognitive factors. Thus, the Cannon research set the stage for future social psychology. Gerth and Mills note: "There do not, for example, seem to be noteworthy differences in the visceral accompaniments of fear and anger. . . . We must go beyond the organism and the physical environment to account for human emotions" (Gerth and Mills 1964, pp. 52–53). While "going beyond" does not mean ignoring the importance of physiology in emotion, it does mean working with a more intricate model than organismic theorists propose of how social and cognitive influences join physiological ones.

#### THE INTERACTIONAL MODEL

The organismic view reduces us to an elicitation-expression model. The interactional model presupposes biology but adds more points to social entry: social factors enter not simply before and after but interactively *during* the experience of emotion. Let us say that a man becomes violently angry when insulted. What, in his cultural milieu, constitutes an insult? As his anger rises, does he recodify the reality to which he responds? Does some feature of the social context aid or inhibit him in this? Simultaneous to his out-



burst, does he react with shame or with pride at the anger? Does he express the anger in ways that work it up or ways that bind it? These are the questions of the interactionist. If we conceptualize emotion as instinct, we never pose questions about these points of social entry in the first place. *By virtue of its greater complexity, the interactional model poses a choice between models of how social factors work.*\*

*Dewey, Gerth and Mills.* Impulse. Dewey argued in 1922, is organized in interaction on the spot. "There are an infinite number of original or instinctive activities which are organized into interests and dispositions according to the situation to which they respond" (Dewey 1922, p. 147). Thus, fear or anger have no common origin in a constitutional disposition. Rather, each feeling takes its shape, and in a sense becomes itself only in social context. Dewey talks of how the self, in the process of charting a course of action, actively recharts and alters that course while interacting with the situation. He does not apply these ideas of emergence and variability to emotion, but he prepared the way for Gerth and Mills to do so.

In the same way, George Herbert Mead did not talk about emotion, but he further cleared a path for doing so from an interactional perspective. In Mead's schema, the self is divided into the spontaneous uncontrolled "I" and the reflective, directing, monitoring "me." Had Mead developed a theory of emotion, he would have begun by elaborating his idea of the "I." To Mead, one person's "I" was as "spontaneous" as another's. He looked for no social differences in this aspect of self. But his own notion of the importance of interaction in formulating the "me" that interacts could also be applied to

\* The task of integrating social patterns with "basic emotionality" was early recognized by Marvin Opler: "If, for example, there is no latency period, as is well known, in the Trobrianders, if Zuni women feel little social sense of deprivation, Okinawans no great sexual shame or guilt, or Samsons little spontaneity and personal freedom in contrast to Navajos, then not only do the mechanisms of adjustment vary, but the basic emotionality involved in a type of adjustment will vary as well" (1956, p. 28; emphasis mine).

the "I"; there may well be differences between the "I" in comparable interactions of, say, an Englishman and an Italian.

Gerth and Mills combine a theory of interaction from Mead, a notion of motivation from Freud, and structural ideas from Weber and Marx in their effort to discover ways in which social structure shapes character (1964, p. xiii). In essence, they do this by linking creeds and symbols to the motivations required for the enactment of institutional roles. Their ideas about emotion are their own; as they say, "George Mead had no adequate notion of emotions and motives, no dynamic theory of the affective life of man" (p. xvii). They distinguish three aspects of emotion: gesture (or behavioral sign), conscious experience, and physiological process. Of these three aspects they focus most on gesture—not as Darwin did, outside an interactional context, but as we see below, within an interactional context. Here, in their words, is how interaction enters into the process of defining feeling:

When our feelings are vague and inchoate, the reactions of others to our gestures may help define what we really come to feel. For example, if a girl has been jilted at the altar and is generally upset about it, the responses of her mother may define the girl's feelings of sadness and great grief, or of indignation and anger. In such cases, our gestures do not necessarily "express" our prior feelings. They make available to others a sign. But what it is a sign of may be influenced by their reactions to it. We, in turn, may internalize their imputation and thus define our inchoate feeling. The social interaction of gestures may thus not only express our feelings but define them as well. (p. 55)

The girl cries. The mother defines the crying as a sign of anger. The girl responds to her mother's interpretation of her tears. "Yes, anger more than sadness." And what the crying "is a sign of" is in this way swayed in interaction with the mother. How do other people influence our understanding of what we feel and, more deeply, even change the "object" of our understanding? How does this influence work differ-

ently in different cultural contexts? Gerth and Mills pose these questions, but they pursue them no further.

*Erving Goffman.* Gerth and Mills address the link between institutions and personalities. Yet the evanescent situations that make up what we call institutions, the situations in which we show our personality, are far more clearly portrayed in the works of Erving Goffman.

The work of Erving Goffman adds two useful ideas—or more precisely, vantage points, to Gerth and Mills: that of the affective deviant, the person with the wrong feeling for the situation and for whom the right feeling would be a conscious burden; and that of the fly on the wall, for whom each second of human action is a long, long tale.

The vantage point of the affective deviant allows Goffman to demonstrate how the social solidarity we take for granted must be continually recreated in daily life. He seems to say, in portrait after portrait, it takes *this* much work for a group to laugh in simultaneous spontaneity, *that* much work to achieve engrossment in a game. The nature of the work varies marvelously, but the fact of it remains quietly constant. Beneath this constant is an implicit comparison with what it might be like for the actor to express what he or she feels regardless of social constraint or to what it might be like if conformity came naturally. For unlike Erich Fromm, Goffman does not assume that the individual is effortlessly, pliantly social. On the other hand, the individual's social feelings are not repressed and made unconscious, as they are for Freud, but consciously suppressed or controlled. The social uses of emotion are clearly stated, but it is not so clear how the individual, apart from the group, can use them.

As fly-on-wall, Goffman focuses on the scene, the situation. Each situation, in his view, has a social logic of its own that people unconsciously sustain. Each situation "taxes" the individual, who in return gets protection from unpredictability and membership in something larger. The affective

deviant is one who tries to avoid paying these social taxes. Taxes, in turn, come in emotive currency. For example, embarrassment is an individual's contribution to the group in the singular sense that embarrassment indicates that the individual cares how he seems in company. Not to feel embarrassed in certain situations is to violate the latent rule that one should care about how the group handles or mishandles one's identity.

The problem with this rendition of reality is that there is no structural bridge between all the situations. There are "taxes" here and "taxes" there but no notion of an overarching pattern that would connect the "collections." Social structure, to Erving Goffman, is only our idea of what many situations of a certain sort add up to. One moves, as Harvey Farberman puts it, "from one fractured island of reality" to the next, and all the work of making a situation seem real must begin afresh each time. To solve this problem, we should take what Goffman has developed and link it to institutions on the one hand and to personality on the other. This would enable us to account for what we predicate from one situation to the next, in both institutions and individuals.

Goffman sharpens his focus by identifying the rules and microacts that are conceptual elements of any situation. Rules establish a sense of obligation and license as they apply to the microacts of seeing, thinking about, remembering, recognizing, feeling, or displaying. Consider, for example, the relation of obligation to *act*: "He will be *obliged* to *prevent* himself from *becoming* so swollen with feelings and a readiness to act that he threatens the bounds regarding affect that have been established for him in the interaction" (1967, pp. 122-123). Or, a gamesman "has a *right* to *deeply involve himself*" (1974, p. 225).

A rule can be distinguished by the micro-act it addresses. Some rules apply to paying attention (1967, p. 115) and thus govern feeling indirectly by governing what might evoke feeling. Other rules apply to feeling directly. For example:



"Participants will hold in check certain psychological states and attitudes, for, after all, the very general rule that one should enter into the prevailing mood in the encounter carries the understanding that contradictory feelings will be held in abeyance" (1961, p. 23). For the most part, however, rules apply only to what the individual thinks and displays, and the link to emotion is left unspecified.

These rules are, in the man, not consciously recognized, "the questioned actor saying he performs for no reason or because he feels like doing so" (1967, p. 49). They are known indirectly, by the reaction that occurs when a rule is broken. They are also assumed to be generally agreed upon and unchanging. (Goffman does pose conflict, but it is less between one set of rules and another than between individual interests and those of the group.)

Just as Freud specialized in analyzing anxiety, so Goffman specializes in studying embarrassment and shame. Goffman shows us the self coming alive only in a social situation where display to other people is an issue. We are invited to ignore all moments in which the individual introspects or dwells on outer reality without a sense of watchers. Thus guilt, the sign of a broken *internalized* rule, is seldom if ever discussed. To discuss it would be to put the rule "inside" the actor, inside a sort of self that Goffman does not deal with.

In discussing rules, micro-acts, and shame-prone actors, Goffman applies the overarching metaphor of acting. His rules are generally rules that apply when we are "on stage." We *play* characters and interact with other *played* characters. But for Goffman, acting is *surface* acting (see Chapter Three). The actor's mental focus is on the slope of a shoulder, the angle of a glance, or the tightness of a smile, not on any inner feeling to which such gestures might correspond. Deep acting is not as empirically alive in Goffman's work, and the theoretical statement about it is correspondingly weaker.

To develop the idea of deep acting, we need a prior notion of a self with a developed inner life. This, in Goffman's ac-

tors, is generally missing. From no other author do we get such an appreciation of the imperialism of rules and such a hazy glimpse of an internally developed self. Goffman himself describes his work as a study of "moments and their men, not men and their moments" (1967). This theoretical choice has its virtues, but also its limitations.

At this point, a brief discussion of those limitations will be a convenient way to introduce my own approach to the study of emotion. Goffman's theory of rules and his theory of self do not correspond. He posits a relation between rule and feeling. Yet the actor he proposes has little inner voice, no active capacity for emotion management that might enable him or her to respond to such rules. Even as rules and micro-acts come alive in Goffman's work, the self *that might perform such acts*, the self that might acknowledge, obey, or struggle against such rules, is correspondingly unreal. Where is the self as subject of emotive experience? What is the relation of *act to self*? Goffman speaks as if his actors can induce, or prevent, or suppress feeling—as if they had a capacity to shape emotion. But what is the relation between this *capacity to act* and the self? Whatever other problems they posed, William James and Sigmund Freud proposed a self that could feel and manage feeling. Goffman does not.

Goffman defines the self as a repository of inner "psychological contributions." As he puts it: "The self . . . as a performed character, is not an organic thing that has specific location . . . [the performer and] his body merely provide the peg on which something of collaborative manufacture will be hung for a time . . . and the means for producing and maintaining self do not reside inside the peg" (1959, pp. 252-253). Actions happen to the self; but the self does not *do* them. Hence Goffman's language is riddled with passives. For "a person becomes engrossed," he writes that "a visual and cognitive engrossment occurs" (1961, p. 38). In addition, nouns do the work of verbs. For "people get involved," he writes that "focused gatherings do have . . . significant prop-

erties... [and] the most crucial of these properties... is the organismic psychological nature of spontaneous involvement" (1961, p. 38). Conversely, "frames" are said to act; they organize cognitive and visual attention, as if autonomously. In order to divest himself of the concept of self, Goffman must reify the concepts just adjacent to the self. Thus frames, or on rare occasions even feeling states, are given the thickness and weight and reality that is denied to the self. Both Herbert Blumer's critique of the implied passivity of the actor in sociological writing (1969) and Roy Schafer's critique of psychoanalytic writing (1976) must be addressed to Goffman. When the self is theoretically dissolved into "psychological materials," no relation between social rules and private experience can be developed.

In Goffman's theory, the capacity to act on feeling derives only from the occasion, not from the individual. The self may actively choose to *display* feelings in order to give outward impressions to others. But it is passive to the point of invisibility when it comes to the private act of managing emotion. The "I" is there, of course, in the many stories from the *San Francisco Chronicle*, in the passages from novels, in hangmen's accounts, in Ionesco plays, in Lillian Gish's autobiography. But the private "I" is simply not there in theory. Feelings are contributions to interactions via the passive medium of a bodily self. We act behaviorally, not affectively. The system affects our behavior, not our feelings.

#### A NEW SOCIAL THEORY OF EMOTION

Goffman has carried the conceptual heritage of Dewey and Gerth and Mills as far as he can without leaving his behaviorism and his "moments and their men" perspective. But now we need a theory that allows us to see how institutions—such as corporations—control us not simply through their surveillance of our behavior but through surveillance of our feelings. Such a social theory of emotion must have both a social

and a psychological side. It can start by extending the question Gerth and Mills ask: How do institutions influence personality? But we may specify that question: How do institutions control how we "personally" control feeling? In pursuit of an answer to this question, I draw, as Gerth and Mills did, on Weber's appreciation of the power of bureaucracy and on Marx's sense of the interests that a bureaucracy actually serves. I also draw frequently on C. Wright Mills's focus, in *White Collar*, on the "sale of personality." But I add to Mills the notion that a personality is not simply "sold"; people actively manage feelings in order to make their personalities fit for public-contact work. I also add three elements found in Goffman: the focus on rules, the perspective of the affective deviant (the worker who is not obeying the feeling rules of the workplace), and an awareness of the effort it takes to pay our "emotional dues" to an occasion.

On the psychological side, a social theory of emotion must take into account that these emotional dues can be costly to the self. Institutional rules run deep but so does the self that struggles with and against them. To manage feeling is to actively try to change a preexisting emotional state.

But then we must ask: What is emotion? Emotion, I suggest, is a biologically given sense, and our most important one. Like other senses—hearing, touch, and smell—it is a means by which we know about our relation to the world, and it is therefore crucial for the survival of human beings in group life. Emotion is unique among the senses, however, because it is related not only to an orientation toward *action* but also to an orientation toward *cognition*.

The connection of emotion to an orientation toward action was key for Darwin. Indeed, he defined emotion as something quite close to this: as a protoaction, as what occurs instead of or before an action, as an action *manqué*. Anger, Darwin suggests, is the preact or prelude to killing; and love is the prelude to copulation; and we may add that envy is the prelude to stealing, gratitude the prelude to giving

back, and jealousy the prelude to excluding. Emotion, therefore, is our experience of the body ready for an imaginary action. Since the body readies itself for action in physiological ways, emotion involves biological processes. Thus when we manage an emotion, we are partly managing a bodily preparation for a consciously or unconsciously anticipated deed. This is why emotion work is *work*, and why estrangement from emotion is estrangement *from* something of importance and weight.

From the interactional theorists, then, we learn what gets done to emotion and feeling and also how feelings are a pre-amble to what gets done to them. From Darwin, as from other organismic theorists, we gain a sense of what, beneath the acts of emotion management, is there to be managed, with institutional guidance or in spite of it. Yet this is not the whole story. It is not simply true that the malleable aspect of emotion is "social" (the focus of the interactional theorists) and that the unmalleable aspect of emotion is its biological link to action (the focus of the organismic theorists). Rather, the unmalleable aspect of emotion (which is what we try to manage) is *also social*. This point could be analytically separated from the rest of the thesis with no harm done, but I add it because I think it introduces still another avenue through which to develop a social theory of emotion. And for this account of the social influence on the unmalleable aspect of emotion I move to Freud's notion of the signal function of emotion, and from there to the influence of our prior expectations about how signals "signal."

I have said that one reason emotion is unique among the senses is because it is related to cognition. Broadly interpreted, cognition is involved in the process by which emotions "signal" messages to the individual. Freud wrote about the "signal function" of anxiety; anxiety, according to Freud, signaled the presence of a danger from within or outside the individual. It was a means by which the individual told of an apprehended danger. Similarly, other emotional states—

such as joy, sadness, and jealousy—can be seen as the senders of signals about our way of apprehending the inner and outer environment. Thus to Darwin's idea of emotion as an action *manqué*, we may add Freud's idea of the signal function; they are two elaborations on how emotion, as a sense, differs from our other senses.

But signaling is complex—it is not the simple conveying of information about the outside world. It is not a telling. It is a comparing. When an emotion signals a message of danger or safety to us, it involves a reality newly grasped *on the temple of prior expectations*. A signal involves a juxtaposition of what we see with what we expect to see—the two sides of surprise. The message "danger" takes on its meaning of "danger" only in relation to what we expect. (Sartre develops this point further, 1948.)

In this regard, expectation enters into the signal function of feeling even as it enters into the signaling of other senses—sight, for example. What we see is known to be mediated through our notions of what we expect to see. As the classic experiments of Solomon Asch have shown, a person who expects to see a long rod on a screen because others around him say they see a long rod reports that he "sees" a long rod even when the rod is short and what the person "sees" is short (1952).

Prior expectations are part and parcel of what we see, and in the same way they are part of what we feel. The idea of prior expectation implies the existence of a prior self that does the expecting. For example, when we feel afraid, the fear signals danger. The realization of danger impinges on our sense of a self that is there to be endangered, a self we expect to persist in a relatively continuous way. Without this prior expectation of a continuous self, information about danger would be signaled in fundamentally different ways. Most of us maintain a prior expectation of a continuous self, but the character of the self we expect to maintain is subject to profoundly social influence. Insofar as our self and all we

expect is social—as by the time of adulthood it inevitably is—the way emotion signals messages to us is also influenced by social factors.

Mechanisms of defense are ways of altering the relation of expectation to grasped fact as well as ways of altering each in itself in order to avoid pain. For example, if a woman suddenly learns that her life partner has been killed, she may alter the character of her understanding of this event so as to keep it in line with what she expects—that he will still be living. She may defend against the self-relevance of the event: “This isn’t happening to *me*.” Or she may defend against the event itself: “He’s still alive. I know he is. I don’t believe he’s dead.” In these ways she holds prior expectation and current perception in a relation to one another that avoids pain.

When we finally go on to make inferences from our feelings to “how I must be interpreting this event” or “what must be happening,” we seem to presume that our emotion *signals* be happening,” we seem to presume that our emotion *signals* not simply our apprehension of the world but our prior expectations about it. It signals the relation between the two. As practical actors in the world, if not as theorists, we seem to read feeling as a tell-tale sign of “what we must have expected or wanted” as well as a sign of “what was going on.”

To sum up, I am joining three theoretical currents. Drawing from Dewey, Gerth and Mills, and Goffman within the interactional tradition, I explore what gets “done to” emotion and how feelings are permeable to what gets done to them. From Darwin, in the organismic tradition, I posit a sense of what is there, impermeable, to be “done to,” namely, a biologically given sense related to an orientation to action. Finally, through Freud, I circle back from the organismic to the interactional tradition, tracing through an analysis of the signal function of feeling how social factors influence what we expect and thus what feelings “signal.”

## Appendix B

### NAMING FEELING

In Appendix A, I offer a review of research on emotion and my own three-part account of emotion. In this appendix, I examine the principle according to which we name feeling.

To name a feeling is to name our way of seeing something, to label our perception.\* As we see in Appendix A, perception is not all there is to emotion or feeling; nor is it its sole cause, but it is the principle according to which emotion and feeling are named. This is the idea advanced by the cognitive psychologist Judith Katz (1980). I develop it here to show that when we do not feel emotion, or disclaim an emotion, we lose touch with how we actually link inner to outer reality.

This theory of emotion naming is an elaboration of what I have said at the end of Appendix A about the social influences on the “signal function” of feeling. Feelings signal not only a newly apprehended reality (outer or inner) but what that reality impinges upon—our prior self and expectations. Now I want to turn this idea around and argue that the names we give emotions refer to the way we apprehend a given situation—the aspect of it we focus on—and what our prior expectations about it are. In short, feeling signals perception and expectation to us, and turning this around, different patterns of perception and expectation correspond to different feeling names. Since culture directs our seeing and expecting, it directs our feeling and our naming of feeling.

\* We do not name feelings after physiological states, for good reason. It has long been known that physiologically, anger has much in common with fear (Schachter and Singer, 1962). Physiological differences are not pronounced enough from one feeling to another to account for the wide variety of emotion names we have in our language. Such differences can at best distinguish between general families of emotion.